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I. INTRODUCTION
The election of Donald Trump on November 8, 2016, represented a radical 
break with many established patterns, norms, and conventions in American 
political life, and the consequences of that election continue to reverberate on 
issues as far flung as foreign affairs and gender relations. Environmental issues 
are an area where Trump’s disruptive presidency has had particular effect. 
Political appointees to senior positions in environmental protection and natural 
resource management have strong ties to regulated industry, a track record of 
hostility toward the agencies they manage, a history of skepticism about climate 
science, and frequently all three.1 Since taking over the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy, and Department of Interior, 
the Trump Administration’s primary agenda has been to delay or roll back the 
environmental and climate efforts of previous Administrations.2 Although 
environmental groups have opposed these measures, the reality is that it is 
extremely difficult to force agencies to implement and enforce the law if they 
are disinclined to do so.3 Until the end of the Trump presidency, environmental 
protection at the federal level can be expected, by and large, to remain in a state 
of stasis at best, and possibly to decay considerably.
The principle of federalism has become something of a rallying cry in recent 
efforts by the Trump Administration and its allies to scale back environmental 
regulation. For example, during his short and troubled tenure, former EPA 
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1 Although written prior to the 2016 election, environmental philosopher Dale 
Jamieson’s REASON IN A DARK TIME: WHY THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE 
FAILED —AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR FUTURE (2014) helps capture some of the tenor of 
the current moment in environmental politics.
2 Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How President Trump Is Changing 
Environmental Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 2, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.
com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment/ [https://perma.cc/5JB3-8N2P].
3 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) (holding nonenforcement 
decision of administrative agencies to be largely unreviewable).
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Administrator Scott Pruitt argued that the federal government has become too 
intrusive and that states should be returned to a position of “regulatory primacy”
on environmental matters.4 One example of this emphasis on federalism is the 
hostility shown toward an Obama-era regulation that clarifies the scope of the 
Clean Water Act.5 For decades, the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers 
(which administers portions of the Act) had interpreted their jurisdiction under 
the Act broadly.6 The Waters of the United States rule was consistent with that 
practice.7 The immediate disavowal of the rule by the Trump Administration is 
one indicator of the change in course that is under way.8
Some states have responded to the impeding federal retreat by forging 
ahead. California has continued to take aggressive steps to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions, and has even taken steps to project its influence internationally; for 
example, by engaging in high profile discussions on climate policy with Chinese 
officials and co-hosting a global climate policy summit with United Nations
Officials,9 New York is restructuring its electricity market to better 
accommodate renewable resources and recently ordered a phase-out of coal 
plants in the state,10 and the Governor of Virginia has ordered his state 
Department of Conservation to draw up plans for the state to meet the 
requirements of the Clean Power Plan, notwithstanding any changes at the 
                                                                                                                     
4 Andrew Childers, Scott Pruitt Could Tip Regulatory Power from EPA to States,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.bna.com/scott-pruitt-tip-n73014449932/ 
[https://perma.cc/UY2H-MMJ5]; see also Coral Davenport et al., E.P.A. Chief Scott Pruitt 
Resigns Under a Cloud of Ethics Scandals, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/07/05/climate/scott-pruitt-epa-trump.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
5 See About Waters of the United States, EPA (last updated Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/about-waters-united-states [https://perma.cc/S249-XEEQ].
6 See Clean Water Act, WOTUS, AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FED’N, https://www.fb.
org/issues/regulatory-reform/clean-water-act/ [https://perma.cc/KZF4-G9HE].
7 Critics of the rule have, naturally, argued that it “vastly expand[ed] EPA’s and the 
Corps’ regulatory authority beyond the limits approved by Congress.” Id. Under this 
interpretation, the Trump Administration merely seeks to reestablish the status quo ante of 
less federal control. Regardless, the prioritization of this particular rule indicates the Trump 
Administration’s emphasis on federalism issues.
8 See Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Blocks Obama-Era Clean Water Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/climate/trump-water-wotus.html [on file 
with Ohio State Law Journal].
9 Jessica Meyers, China is Now Looking to California—Not Trump—to Help Lead the 
Fight Against Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/
asia/la-fg-china-global-climate-20170606-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q7D9-K384]; About 
the Summit, GLOB. CLIMATE ACTION SUMMIT, https://globalclimateactionsummit.org/about-
the-summit/ [https://perma.cc/AC9S-QFJ2].
10 Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. STATE, https://rev.ny.gov/ [https://perma.cc/
9WVD-YB3B]; Governor Cuomo Announces Proposed Regulations to Make New York 
Power Plants Coal-Free by 2020, N.Y. STATE (May 17, 2018), https://www.governor.
ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-proposed-regulations-make-new-york-power-
plants-coal-free-2020 [https://perma.cc/8FPD-H8AV].
2018] ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 669
federal level.11 Overall, fourteen states (plus Puerto Rico) have joined the U.S. 
Climate Alliance, committing themselves to meeting the targets adopted by the 
Obama Administration for the United States under the Paris Accord, which has 
been renounced by the Trump Administration.12 Several state attorneys general 
have worked together to use the power of their offices to oppose the Trump 
Administration’s environmental agenda.13
Despite these hopeful signs of resistance, the net effect of the Trump 
Administration’s efforts to scale back federal environmental policy is likely to 
undermine rather than energize state environmental policymaking. In states 
dominated by Democratic politicians, environmental policies at odds with the 
new political leadership at the national level is a way to signal their partisan 
allegiance, akin to the Republican state leaders who refused to participate in the 
Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion.14 But state policymaking is not 
needed only in so-called Blue states. Though Blue states can develop new 
policies that may more efficiently and effectively address environmental harms 
in their own states, they cannot directly influence policymaking in Red and 
Purple states—those which are dominated by Republicans or are not fully 
dominated by either party (respectively). Moreover, the policies that are adopted 
by Blue states may not be politically attractive in Red and Purple states. 
In order to effectively address nationwide environmental problems, the most 
valuable information that could be obtained from state-level environmental 
policymaking is political information about which policies can be attractive to 
decisionmakers in Red and Purple states. This political information is distinct 
from data on which policies are actually most effective when implemented, but 
instead focuses on how proposed policies are likely to be received in different 
political environments. Political information from Red and Purple states has the 
potential to break the gridlock on environmental issues that now overwhelms 
our national political institutions, by demonstrating forward-looking solutions 
that might be palatable across the political spectrum at either the state or federal 
level.15 Unfortunately, there is little evidence that—without a sustained push by 
the federal government—Red and Purple states will do much beside maintain 
                                                                                                                     
11 Jack Fitzpatrick, Virginia Looks to Cut Emissions Regardless of Clean Power Plan 
Review, MORNING CONSULT (May 16, 2017), https://morningconsult.com/2017/05/16/
virginia-looks-cut-emissions-regardless-clean-power-plan-review/ [https://perma.cc/J4L9-
BD77].
12 Georgina Gustin, 14 States: We’re on Track to Meet Paris Climate Goals, Despite 
Trump, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 21, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/21092
017/states-paris-trump-climate-change-alliance-leadership-jerry-brown-cuomo-inslee-nrdc-
2050 [https://perma.cc/8YA6-ENXX]. 
13 Lisa Friedman & John Schwartz, Borrowing G.O.P. Playbook, Democratic States 
Sue the Government and Rack Up Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/03/21/climate/attorneys-general-trump-environment-lawsuits.html [on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal].
14 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2014).
15 Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 706 
(2017).
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the current status quo. Without those efforts at the state level, showing the way 
for national-level politicians to make new coalitions and alignments on 
environmental issues, there is a danger that the current state of impasse may 
prove difficult to leave behind.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM AND INFORMATION GATHERING
Although politicians are often happy to offer paeans to states’ rights, they 
rarely talk much about the values served by federalism. Granting more power to 
the states is not an end unto itself, but rather a means of promoting other ends. 
Traditionally, the most commonly accepted purposes of decentralizing 
governance authority are preference diversity, political responsiveness, better 
attention to local conditions and effects, and experimentation.16 These benefits 
of decentralization must be balanced against the benefits of centralization, 
which include harmonization and more complete internalization of externalities. 
U.S. environmental law does not always fit with these substantive justifications 
for centralization or decentralization,17 but nonetheless, these are the motivating 
values behind the cooperative federal-state relationship found in U.S. 
environmental law. 
An area of particular focus in federalism scholarship in recent years is a 
focus on the political side of experimentation. Justice Brandeis’s famous 
“laboratories of democracy” model of federalism explicitly analogized state 
decision-making to a scientific process.18 Of course, it is possible for state 
policy experimentation to generate “deliberative information” of the kind that 
could be used by a public-spirited decision maker to improve social well-
being.19 This deliberative information might even include new perspectives on 
moral or ethical questions.20 For example, on the issue of immigration, there is 
                                                                                                                     
16 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 386–400 (1997).
17 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996) (discussing the impacts of the Clean Air Act 
and how those effects comport with justifications for centralizing environmental policy, such 
as preventing states from incentivizing polluters to locate in their jurisdiction with less 
stringent regulations and the ability of the national government to deal with externalities of 
pollution that are felt nationwide).
18 New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).
19 Livermore, supra note 15, at 640.
20 See generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview,
123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1894 (2014) (discussing “discursive benefits of structure”); Michael C. 
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267 (1998) (discussing democratic experimentalism and its potential to reconcile two 
different schools of thought on federalism). To some degree, democratic or discursive 
benefits discussed by Gerken, Dorf, and Sabel straddle the line between the categories of 
deliberative and political information. See Livermore, supra note 15, at 640. There is some 
value in distinguishing between the two types of information, but the more important insight 
is that information from policy experimentation—no matter its kind—can be put to both 
good and bad uses, depending on the incentives and motivations of the relevant actors.
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considerable variation in local attitudes and policies. The “discretionary spaces 
of federalism” allow local officials to implement their preferred policies (at least 
to some extent).21 These policy choices become an opportunity for people to 
discuss and defend their values in a context where their real world consequences 
are visible.22
But it is also possible for state experimentation to generate information on 
the political effects of different policies—as when local politicians observe 
whether their peers in other jurisdictions are rewarded or punished by voters for 
their choices. This second political type of information can be used by advocates 
or politicians to promote their agendas, which range from maximizing well-
being to securing personal pecuniary rewards. This type of political information 
might involve lobbying tricks that can be used by special interest groups to 
extract special favors from state legislatures, but it also includes organizing or 
communications strategies that can be used by public interest oriented groups. 
Devolving authority to the states can produce both deliberative information as 
well as political information, both of which can be put to both good or bad uses, 
depending on the motivations of the players involved. 
Creating the right balance of centralized and decentralized authority 
requires careful attention to context. The Waters of the United States rule is a 
good example. The rule clarifies the jurisdiction of the EPA (and Army Corps 
of Engineers) to regulate smaller water bodies and wetlands under the Clean 
Water Act.23 If state or local governments can control this pollution effectively, 
then this might be an area where decentralization makes sense. But, if polluters 
are able to use local policy experiments to learn how to effectively advocate for 
weaker standards, while environmental interests have a harder time sharing 
information across jurisdictions, the net effect may be learning that facilitates 
special interests at the expense of the public. In addition, many states have 
passed laws banning any clean water regulation that is more stringent than 
federal standards, meaning that if the EPA pulls away, it creates a policy 
vacuum, rather than a space for experimentation.24 In this case, the information-
creating potential for decentralization might provide a justification for more, 
rather than less, involvement by the national government.
Climate change provides a reverse case study. There are extremely powerful 
reasons to regulate greenhouse gases at the national, or even global, level. It is 
                                                                                                                     
21 Gerken, supra note 20, at 1910 (quoting Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict 
Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2097 (2014)).
22 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 595 (2008). See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, Federalism and 
National Consensus (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal)
(discussing ideological diversity in the context of federalism policy debates).
23 See supra note 6.
24 ENVTL. LAW INST., STATE CONSTRAINTS: STATE-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON THE 
AUTHORITY OF AGENCIES TO REGULATE WATERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL 
CLEAN WATER ACT 11 (2013), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d23-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DM8F-9F4G].
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a basic fact of greenhouse gases that, no matter where they are emitted, they 
contribute equally to climate change around the world.25 For the purposes of 
climate change damages in California, it is irrelevant if greenhouse gases are 
emitted in Los Angeles or Beijing. This physical fact means that there are 
massive inter-jurisdictional externalities in the case of climate change, and—
absent a policy or liability regime—rational but self-interested jurisdictions will 
release levels of emissions that are sensible from a local perspective but 
inefficiently high from a global perspective. That is why climate advocates have 
focused so much of their efforts on a global agreement. Domestically, the 
national government is exposed to more risks of climate damage than any given 
state, and so can be expected, in general, to internalize more of these climate 
externalities and pursue more efficient policies.
Despite these strong reasons to favor national action, the Obama 
Administration’s Clean Power Plan relied heavily on states to determine their 
climate policies.26 While the national government set an overall emissions 
limitation goal, states had a substantial amount of leeway in deciding how to 
meet that goal.27 This particular allocation of federal and state authority created 
tremendous potential for the state experimentation to generate useful political 
information. Climate change is an area where a deep state of gridlock has settled 
in at the national level, and new ideas for political coalitions and alignments are 
desperately needed. By forcing states—including those dominated by 
Republican politicians—to develop climate policies, the Clean Power Plan 
created incentives for political actors to develop policies and messaging around 
the issue that would appeal to diverse constituencies. After a period of 
experimentation, the diverse approaches could be compared to each other, not 
only based on their policy success, but also based on their political appeal. This 
information could then feed into the national climate discussion, potentially 
helping to resolve the current state of impasse on the issue. This potential 
information-upside helps justify greater decentralization than might otherwise 
make sense. 
Unfortunately, the Clean Power Plan was stayed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
before it could be put in place, and since the 2016 presidential election, 
Administrator Pruitt has begun taking steps toward its repeal.28 Without an 
effective prod at the national level, there is precious little incentive for states 
that are not otherwise inclined to do so to enact meaningful reductions. Perhaps 
ironically, the massive decentralization of climate policy that will likely occur 
                                                                                                                     
25 NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 28
(2007). 
26 See Alison Cassady & Myriam Alexander-Kearns, 5 Ways the Final Clean Power 




28 Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017).
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due to EPA’s retreat will mean less, not more, information generated by the 
states on smart and politically savvy approaches to climate change. 
Nevertheless, there is some hope for progress on climate at the state level in the 
coming years. Politicians in Blue states are already staking out positions on 
climate change to signal their disagreement with the Trump Administration.29
This will create space for some policy experimentation. It is reasonably likely 
that some Red and Purple states may make policy in related areas, such as clean 
energy. Although the framing is different, these policies have obvious climate 
benefits, and some valuable political information may be generated. Even if the 
global nature of the greenhouse gas pollution likely interferes with states 
engaging in optimal policy adoption, that does not imply that no progress can 
be made. 
The following two Parts flesh out in more detail the effects of the Trump 
EPA’s decision to roll back federal climate change policy.30 The Clean Power 
Plan had the potential to generate the kind of information that could have 
profoundly shifted the political conversation on climate change. Abandoning 
the Plan will mean that there is much less potential for that kind of shift. But, 
even without the active involvement of the federal government, state action is 
occurring: examining how states are responding to the new policy vacuum at 
the federal level instructively illustrates both what could have been, and what 
may still come to pass. 
III. STATE OF CLIMATE POLICY
In light of President Trump and Administrator Pruitt’s statements that they 
intend to repeal the Clean Power Plan and other federal greenhouse gas 
regulations,31 states have a choice as to whether or not they plan to move 
forward on climate policy. Blue states, and possibly some Purple states, are 
likely to keep acting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while Red states and 
other Purple states are likely to stop any preparations they had begun to comply 
                                                                                                                     
29 See David Hasemyer, The New Climate Watchdogs: Democratic Attorneys General 
Take on Trump, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 21, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
21122017/climate-change-attorney-general-trump-lawsuit-2017-year-review 
[https://perma.cc/SQV4-5G8L].
30 See infra Parts III, IV.
31 See Nathan Rott, Trump Moves to Let States Regulate Coal Plant Emissions, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 21, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/21/639396683/trump
-moves-to-let-states-regulate-coal-plant-emissions [https://perma.cc/PZ9Y-4NSQ]; Brady 
Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Tells Coal Miners He Will Repeal Power 
Plant Rule Tuesday: ‘The War Against Coal Is Over’, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/10/09/pruitt-tells-
coal-miners-he-will-repeal-power-plan-rule-tuesday-the-war-on-coal-is-over/?utm_term=.d
86ed3c0d2ef [https://perma.cc/V5FD-3AH7]; Tom DiChristopher, Trump EPA Will Revise 
Obama Fuel Efficiency, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rule for Autos, CNBC (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/02/trump-epa-will-revise-obama-fuel-efficiency-rules-for-
autos.html [https://perma.cc/557A-YCU6].
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with the Clean Power Plan. While the technical information on the relative 
effectiveness of different policies adopted in Blue states may prove valuable to 
all states and the federal government when they eventually decide to move 
forward with climate policy,32 the political information developed in Blue states 
about how to get policies adopted is unlikely to be applicable in Red states, with 
their distinctive political forces. With fewer Red states moving forward, the 
country will lose out on developing valuable political information on how to 
advance climate policy in more conservative areas.33 In this Part, we focus on 
this missed opportunity. 
A number of Blue states are charging ahead to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions that contribute to climate change, and they are learning political 
lessons that may prove useful, but only in other progressive jurisdictions. 
California has long been a leader on climate policy, with its 2006 Assembly Bill
32, which created a cap and trade system and other forms of greenhouse gas 
regulations.34 However, even in a Blue state like California, with Democratic 
supermajorities in both houses and a Democratic governor, climate regulation 
has not always faced smooth sailing. The initial authorization for significant 
portions of Assembly Bill 32 was set to expire in 2020.35 In 2015, oil and gas 
interests joined with lower-income community advocates to block an extension 
of Assembly Bill 32, arguing that the burdens, but not the benefits, would 
disproportionately fall on poor communities and communities of color.36 After 
much legislative and gubernatorial effort over two terms, the greenhouse gas 
reduction program was extended to 2030, with a re-authorization of the cap and 
trade program but also more oversight for the Air Resources Board in 
administering the program and additional specific requirements to address 
criteria air pollutants in disadvantaged communities.37 California’s approach 
                                                                                                                     
32 See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (reviewing the results 
from California and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative states in deciding what approach 
to apply to select the best system of emission reduction for greenhouse gas emissions from 
power plants under the Clean Power Plan).
33 It is possible that even under the Clean Power Plan, Red states would have refused 
to develop polices and instead have decided to allow the EPA to proceed through Federal 
Implementation Plans. If that had been the case, then the information-production benefits of 
the rule would have been reduced. 
34 Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
35 See Cara Horowitz, California’s Cap-and-Trade Program After 2020, LEGAL 
PLANET (July 22, 2016), http://legal-planet.org/2016/07/22/californias-cap-and-trade-
program-after-2020/ [https://perma.cc/ACL9-J5R7].
36 See Chris Megerian & Melanie Mason, California’s New Climate Change Laws 
Almost Didn’t Happen This Year. Here’s How Lawmakers Pulled It Off., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
2, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-climate-deal-inside-look-20160902-
snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/P4CZ-JQ9W].
37 See S. B. 32, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); Assemb. B. 197, 2016 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2016); Assemb. B. 398, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); Assemb. B. 617, 2017 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). See also Comments on Discussion Draft, 2030 Target Scoping 
Plan Update 1, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY (Dec. 16, 2016), http://policyintegrity.org/
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may provide useful political information for other Blue states looking to address 
similar concerns from disadvantaged communities, but its model is unlikely to 
prove politically useful outside of Blue states because it is viewed as atypically 
liberal.
Other Blue states are also moving forward on climate policy, with political 
lessons that may prove useful to other Blue states, but likely not more broadly. 
For example, Washington has developed a number of policies addressing 
greenhouse gas emissions over the years, including the governor’s office 
adopting the Social Cost of Carbon to value the climate effects of state policy 
proposals.38 In 2016, climate advocates placed an initiative on the state ballot to 
require a statewide revenue neutral carbon tax.39 Other environmental 
advocates, including the Sierra Club, opposed the measure because they were 
developing their own statewide proposal which would involve more targeted 
beneficiaries of the funds raised by carbon regulation.40 The revenue-neutral 
carbon tax measure failed to pass.41 Meanwhile, the executive branch has been 
developing its own carbon cap program,42 and mainstream environmental 
groups and labor groups have been working together to develop a redesigned 
carbon tax legislative proposal that would satisfy the various stakeholders.43
                                                                                                                     
documents/Policy_Integrity_ARB_use_of_SCC_under_AB_197_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MU3C-N8N2]; California Air Resources Board, The 2017 Climate Change 
Scoping Plan Update, ES1–3 (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2030
sp_pp_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/BCC9-MR6V].
38 WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 2 (Sept. 29, 
2014), http://www.commerce.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Energy-EV-Planning-
Social-Cost-of-Carbon-Sept-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBH9-EF3E]; Washington Carbon 
Pollution Reduction and Clean Energy Action, Exec. Order 14-04 (Apr. 29, 2014), available 
at http://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/exe_order/eo_14-04.pdf [https://perma.cc
/FWG2-PX4F].
39 Lewis Kamb, Washington Voters Reject Initiative to Impose Carbon Tax on Fossil 
Fuels, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/
carbon-emissions-tax-initiative-732/ [https://perma.cc/DFM3-KDVM]. 
40 See Chelsea Harvey, The Battle Over Washington State’s Carbon Tax Has Gotten 
Even Weirder, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2016/11/07/the-bizarre-political-fight-over-washington-states-ballot-
measure-to-tax-carbon/?utm_term=.eafdd43e68ca [https://perma.cc/QK8W-G6CH];
Rebecca Leber, Inside the Carbon Tax Fight That’s Dividing Environmentalists, MOTHER 
JONES (Nov. 1, 2016, 4:19 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/11/
washington-carbon-tax-i732/ [https://perma.cc/W6MS-NVKS].
41 Kamb, supra note 39; Marianne Lavelle, Washington State Voters Reject Nation’s
First Carbon Tax, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/09112016/washington-state-carbon-tax-i-732-ballot-measure [https://perma.cc/PGP2-
8XHU].
42 See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, CHAPTERS 173-442 AND 173-441 WAC:
OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN AIR RULE (Oct. 2, 2017), available at https://ecology.wa.gov/
Regulations-Permits/Laws-rules-rulemaking/Closed-rulemaking/WAC-173-442,-441-
Overview [https://perma.cc/85XP-JCY5].
43 Hal Bernton, Washington State Alliance to Push a Reworked Carbon-Tax Proposal,
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news
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That bill, as well as a climate bill in Oregon, failed in the 2018 legislative 
session, but advocates are optimistic for the prospect of passing climate laws 
through future legislative sessions and initiative processes.44
Climate policy efforts are moving forward in some Purple states, which 
could provide political information that is more broadly applicable in Red and 
Purple states. For example, in May 2017, the governor of Virginia instructed the 
state’s Department of Environmental Quality to develop a greenhouse gas 
reduction plan for the state.45 In November 2017, the Virginia Air Pollution 
Control Board approved a proposal to release for public comment that would 
integrate Virginia into the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the process 
of facilitating that integration has begun.46 New Jersey also has begun the 
process to re-enter the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative program.47 A handful 
of states with Republican governors have also joined the U.S. Climate Alliance, 
a consortium of states created after the election to help advance greenhouse gas
policy.48 Massachusetts also issued a new set of greenhouse gas regulations that 
go above and beyond its commitments in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, proposed in early 2017, finalized in August 2017, and amended in 
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both December 2017 and August 2018.49 In theory, the Massachusetts 
regulations could help provide political information on what approaches are 
feasible for a Republican governor. However, the Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection was developing the regulation in response to a court 
order that found that the agency had failed to properly implement its Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2008.50 As a result, the governor had more political 
cover than another state’s Republican governor who might want to move the 
ball forward on climate policy in the absence of a court order.51
Perhaps the biggest drawback of the change in federal administrations is the 
fact that many Red and some Purple states have pulled back from efforts they 
had been making to implement the Clean Power Plan and other greenhouse gas 
policies under the Obama Administration. For example, Arizona had formally 
announced that it was undertaking efforts to comply with the Clean Power Plan, 
despite its opposition to the plan on legal grounds.52 Arizona is no longer 
undertaking those efforts under this new Administration, and coal power plants 
in the state are staying open longer than they had planned.53 Likewise, Idaho, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, South Carolina, and a number of other states had been 
working to develop Clean Power Plan compliance plans, but are now no longer 
moving forward with these actions.54 With these Red and Purple states pulling 
                                                                                                                     
49 See Electricity Generator Emissions Limits, 310 CMR 7.74, (Aug. 2018), available 
at https://www.mass.gov/guides/electricity-generator-emissions-limits-310-cmr-774
[https://perma.cc/CFB5-P7SG]. See also Inst. For Policy Integrity, Comments to 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection on Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Under Section 3(d) of the Global Warming Solutions Act 1 (Feb. 24, 2017),
http://policyintegrity.org/documents/Institute_for_Policy_Integrity_Comments_on_Regulat
ions_to_Implement_Global_Warming_Solutions_Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AGM-S5YN]
(“The Commonwealth of Massachusetts shows its dedication to reducing its greenhouse gas 
emissions in the Global Warming Solutions Act, in Governor Baker’s Executive Order 569, 
and in these proposed regulations.”).
50 See Kain v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 49 N.E.3d 1124, 1128 (Mass. 2016).
51 A similar dynamic could present itself for other Republican governors at a future 
time, in which case the Massachusetts example may prove illuminating. 
52 See Clean Power Plan Hub: Arizona, E&E NEWS, https://www.eenews.net/intera
ctive/clean_power_plan/states/arizona [https://perma.cc/DM2T-6PVU] (describing 
Arizona’s plan to reduce carbon emissions after the stay of the Clean Power Plan).
53 See Associated Press, Navajo Council OKs Lease Extension for Arizona Coal Plant,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 27, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/arizona/articles/2017-06-27/navajo-council-approves-lease-extension-for-coal-plant 
(on file with Ohio State Law Journal). Note, however, that this plant, while inside Arizona, 
is under Navajo, not state jurisdiction.
54 See Clean Power Plan Hub: Idaho, E&E NEWS (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.eenews.
net/interactive/clean_power_plan/states/Idaho [https://perma.cc/5FXU-9SZJ]; Clean Power 
Plan Hub: Pennsylvania, E&E NEWS (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/interactive
/clean_power_plan/states/Pennsylvania [https://perma.cc/NK4G-UQFN]; Clean Power 
Plan Hub: Ohio, E&E NEWS (May 13, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_
power_plan/states/ohio [https://perma.cc/2X6T-88YC]; Clean Power Plan Hub: South 
Carolina, E&E NEWS (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_
678 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:4
back from their efforts to develop workable climate policy under the Clean 
Power Plan, the country will lose out on a great deal of valuable political 
information that could have been generated.
Additionally, the Trump Administration has begun taking steps to preempt 
state initiative on certain aspects of climate policy.55 Under the Clean Air Act, 
California is unique among states in having the authority to set its own 
automobile emissions standards, which other states can then choose to adopt 
instead of the federal standards.56 In granting California a waiver from general 
preemption requirements, Congress recognized the state’s unique pollution 
problem and pioneering efforts in imposing automobile emission restrictions.57
In 2009 and 2013, EPA granted California’s request for a waiver to set its own 
emission standards for greenhouse gases from cars through model year 2025.58
EPA recently proposed the revocation of California’s waiver to set its own 
emissions standards for cars.59
IV. STATE ELECTRICITY POLICY
State electricity policy is interrelated with, but still distinct from, state 
climate policy. The electricity sector is responsible for 34% of national 
                                                                                                                     
plan/states/south _carolina [https://perma.cc/AY89-H3XT]. Some of the states even planned 
to continue moving forward actively in the face of the Supreme Court’s February 2016 stay 
of the rule.
55 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Dlouhy et al., EPA Chief Signals Showdown with California on 
Fuel Emission Standards, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2018-03-13/epa-chief-signals-showdown-with-california-on-tailpipe-standards 
[ https://perma.cc/2CJ4-GUWZ].
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2012).
57 See S. REP. NO. 403, at 33 (1967) (“Senator Murphy convinced the committee that 
California’s unique problems and pioneering efforts justified a waiver of the preemption 
section to the State of California.”); see also Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California’s Authority 
to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 
716 (2003) (“There is some evidence that the waiver provision was primarily enacted to give 
California flexibility to tackle its unique smog problem, resulting from special geographic 
characteristics and high population levels.”). 
58 California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, Notice of Decision 
Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model 
Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744 
(2009); California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, Notice of Decision 
Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean Car 
Program and a Within the Scope Confirmation for California’s Zero Emission Vehicle 
Amendments for 2017 and Earlier Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. 2112 (Jan. 9, 2013) (giving 
California a waiver of Clean Air Act preemption).
59 The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–
2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986, 42,999 (proposed Aug. 24, 
2018).
2018] ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 679
emissions of carbon dioxide.60 Furthermore, over recent years, including with 
the Clean Power Plan, state electricity policy began incorporating more 
consideration of associated climate impacts.61 Nonetheless, state energy policy 
has retained a distinct set of laws and customs separate from environmental 
policy.62 With respect to electricity policy, though Blue states are likely to keep 
pushing forward on clean energy policy despite the change in administrations, 
some Red and Purple states may also keep pushing forward on clean energy 
policy, generating useful political information in a sector that may have 
substantial climate benefits. However, the federal government might be able to 
throw a wrench in the efforts of states to innovate, if the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission or Department of Energy attempt to preempt state 
policy, stymying the ability of those states to develop useful political 
information.
With respect to Blue states, a number of states have been working to push 
clean energy forward. For example, New York’s Public Service Commission 
has been redesigning its system to support the clean energy grid of the future 
through its Reforming the Energy Vision proceeding.63 New York has also 
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reevaluated its incentives paid to low carbon electricity generating resources, 
through its Clean Energy Standard program with its Renewable Energy Credits 
and Zero Emissions Credits.64 Hawaii has set a goal of 100% renewable energy 
by 2045.65 (A recent bill with a similar target just passed in California in the 
2018 legislative session.)66 Minnesota has undergone a thorough process to 
incorporate the Social Cost of Carbon into its resource planning decisions, based 
on a state law that requires consideration of environmental externalities.67 The 
state recently approved a higher value of the Social Cost of Carbon, but less than 
what environmental advocates had pushed for.68 Similarly, the Washington 
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Utilities and Transportation Commission recently instructed three of the state’s
regulated utilities to begin using a social cost of carbon value in their analysis 
of resource alternatives in their Integrated Resource Plans.69
It is not just Blue states pushing for clean energy policy, however. Some 
Red and Purple states—and municipalities within those states—keep working 
to promote cleaner generation as a part of their electricity mix. For example, in 
2015, the Nevada Public Utilities Commission had significantly reduced net 
metering subsidies for rooftop solar generation.70 A large public outcry 
followed, along with a shift of the state legislature from Red to Blue,71 and in 
June of 2017, the Republican governor signed a bill restoring the higher net 
metering subsidies for rooftop solar.72 The 2017 legislative session also 
included a suite of other clean energy bills that were passed and signed by the 
governor.73 In Colorado, the Public Utilities Commission instructed a utility to 
use the Social Cost of Carbon in a sensitivity analysis for its Integrated Resource 
Plan,74 which could result in a less carbon-intensive resource mix. 
The availability of sources of cheap and plentiful renewable energy sources 
can create incentives for otherwise more conservative states to support clean 
energy policy. For example, the newly elected Republican governor of Iowa has 
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listed “developing the most innovative energy policy in the country” as one of 
her four key platforms, and wind energy makes up over 36% of state 
electricity.75 Likewise, though the state of Texas has not formally incentivized 
wind production, the ready availability of wind has led it to make up over 14%
of state electricity production.76 Certain more liberal municipalities within 
conservative states have taken formal steps to incentivize clean energy 
production. For example, the municipal utility in Austin, Texas has 
implemented the Social Cost of Carbon in its resource planning process.77
(Austin’s utility also supported the Clean Power Plan in the litigation 
challenging the rule.)78
These examples of Red and Purple states, and their municipalities, moving 
forward on clean energy policy provide some information on the kinds of 
climate policies that can satisfy Republican constituencies, efforts that may be 
copied or built upon in jurisdictions with similar political dynamics. However, 
it is possible that the federal government might try to stymie these state efforts, 
which would hamper these states’ abilities to generate useful political 
information. States and the federal government share jurisdiction over 
electricity under the Federal Power Act, with state public utilities commissions 
addressing retail transactions and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
addressing wholesale transactions.79 The dividing line can be murky, especially 
with newer behind-the-meter resources like rooftop solar and energy storage.80
Competitor generators often challenge state policies that favor other types 
of generators as being preempted by the Federal Power Act or violating the 
dormant commerce clause.81 These cases are often addressed without the 
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involvement of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, such as recent 
cases in New York and Illinois federal courts that challenged those states’ Zero 
Emission Credit programs that compensate nuclear energy production for its 
low-carbon attributes.82 In both of those cases, the state programs were upheld 
against preemption and dormant commerce clause challenges at the district 
court level, without the involvement of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission.83 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission filed an amicus 
curiae brief in the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the Federal Power Act does not 
preempt the Illinois Zero Emission Credit program, and the Seventh Circuit 
upheld Illinois’s program.84
However, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission might change its 
position in future cases and could have the option of ruling that similar state 
policies impermissibly interfere with wholesale markets and are, therefore, 
preempted. A ruling of this sort would carry independent force, and likely also 
deference from a court deciding the issue. If the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission decides to travel down this path, that could interfere with the ability 
of states to pursue clean energy policy and generate useful political information 
about how to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the federalist structure of the U.S. system creates sites of political 
resistance and contestation during a dark time in environmental politics,85 in 
cases where collective action is needed, the national government remains 
indispensable. Some states, especially Blue states, continue to forge ahead on
climate and clean energy policy in the face of regulatory rollbacks at the federal 
level. But these efforts face headwinds in the form of resistance from the federal 
government. Even worse, development on these policies has slowed or stopped 
in many Red and Purple states under the Trump Administration. This represents 
a lost opportunity to develop valuable political information about how to 
productively approach climate policy in more conservative areas. The lack of 
experimentation on climate policy in conservative states means that, when a 
moment of national policy making on climate again arises, the Republican party 
is likely to be short on proactive ideas. Without a policy program that 
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acknowledges and responds in a meaningful way to the reality of climate 
change, Republicans may again find themselves in a reactive and oppositional 
mode, leading either to a repeat of the policy failures of the past, or policy 
progress that lacks bipartisan support. Either way, the track record of halting, 
easily reversed, and extremely limited action on climate change is, 
unfortunately, likely to continue. 
